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South Korea’s Engagement in Central Asia from the 
End of the Cold War to the “New Asia Initiative”
This paper examines South Korea’s engagement in Central Asia as a case study of 
the country’s broader efforts to establish itself as a more assertive regional and 
global economic and political player. Embedding the analysis in the account of the 
evolving nature of Korean-Central Asian relations over the past two decades, the 
paper locates Korea’s policy towards the region within its attempts to tackle energy 
vulnerability. Without the “political baggage” that accompanies the presence of 
other major players, Korea’s economically-driven country-specific strategy is 
yielding significant results.
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Introduction
In the early 1990s South Korea quickly dislodged the ties that North 
Korea had with the Soviet successor states, which were a legacy of 
earlier Soviet-North Korean relations. Those ties, of course, included 
relations with the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Diplomatic ties between the 
Central Asian states and North Korea were retained, but relations with 
South Korea were upgraded and expanded. The presence and influence 
of South Korea in Central Asia have, since then, steadily expanded and 
deepened. During the 1990s and until the mid- to late 2000s Central Asia 
was not a top priority region for Seoul, which kept its focus primarily on 
educational exchanges and offered some support to the local ethnic 
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Korean communities, descendants of those deported by Stalin from the 
Soviet Far East in 1937. The Asian financial crisis that struck South 
Korea in 1997 slowed down Seoul’s engagement in the region, with 
many projects suspended or abandoned. By the mid-2000s, however, 
South Korea’s position had recovered, and investment and trade turnover 
have increased dramatically, making the country one of Central Asia’s 
main commercial partners and sources of foreign investment, as well as a 
noticeable recipient of South Korea’s overseas aid. Seoul has 
complemented this focus on business with an upgrading of political ties, 
bilaterally and multilaterally.
Seoul’s involvement in the region may be divided into two main 
phases. In the first decade following the independence of the Central 
Asian republics, South Korea maintained a low profile, with the 
exception of Uzbekistan where it clearly emerged as one of the country’s 
main economic partners. In the 2000s, after a brief hiatus, attention 
broadened to encompass the other republics. The Roh Moo-hyun 
administration (2003-2008) began to pay some attention to the Central 
Asian markets. The Lee Myung-bak administration (2009-2013) later 
built on this interest and deepened cooperation. The “New Asia 
Initiative,” launched in 2009, was both aimed at expanding its role in the 
Central Asian region specifically as well as part of a broader effort to 
establish South Korea as a global political and economic player (CWD, 
2009).1 President Lee has emphasized the importance of Central Asia in 
his efforts to diversify energy supplies and reduce energy dependence on 
the Middle East.
It is the main contention here that the gradual, low profile approach 
taken by Seoul has begun to pay off. Without the “political baggage” that 
accompanies the presence of the United States, Russia, and China, South 
Korea’s focused and country-specific strategy is yielding results as 
1¡ On South Korea’s role in regional and global politics see Shim & Flamm (2012).
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economic cooperation makes Seoul one of the main partners of the two 
largest economies in the region, namely Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The 
paper proceeds by examining the strategic and economic importance of 
post-Soviet Central Asia in the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
Next, it traces the significance of this region to South Korea. The next 
section discusses the ranges of interests and approaches taken by Seoul 
to establish and consolidate its presence in the region, paying special 
importance to the “New Asia Cooperation Diplomacy,” most notably the 
“New Asia Initiative” introduced during the Lee Myung-bak 
administration. Therein Central Asia figures prominently. The paper 
concludes with an assessment of the prospects of Korean-Central Asian 
relations. 
Central Asia’s Rising Strategic and Economic 
Importance in the Late Twentieth and Early Twenty-
First Centuries
This section provides a brief historical overview of the Central Asian 
region, focusing on the similarities of the five republics, mostly resulting 
from shared Soviet legacies, and their differences. Contrary to what 
happened in the Baltics, Ukraine, and Georgia, the Central Asian 
republics (Kazakh, Uzbek, Kirgiz, Turkmen, and Tajik Union Republics, 
or SSRs) did not actively seek independence from the Soviet center 
(Beissinger, 2002). Rather, to use a commonly used expression to capture 
Central Asia’s experience in this regard, they were “catapulted to 
independence” (Olcott, 1992). Revisiting the last two decades of Central 
Asian history goes well beyond the scope of this paper2; as one word it is 
important to recall that the newly independent states were confronted 
2¡ For a comprehensive review of the main challenges and political, economic, and social changes 
see Cummings (2012).
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with significant and simultaneous challenges in four key areas: state-
building, nation-building, economic transformation, and foreign policy-
making (Cummings, 2012, p. 4). Legacies, opportunities, and challenges 
in each of these areas will be reviewed below in order to provide some 
context for understanding the rationale behind South Korea’s quest for 
greater ties with the region. To anticipate the thrust of the main argument 
put forward in this section, all these highlight the region’s “diversity in 
uniformity,” that is a simultaneous presence of ‘evident commonalities as 
well as stark differences’ in the various processes undertaken by the five 
republics (ibid.).
Common legacies included – among others – shared cultural 
threads, namely a combination of sedentary and nomadic civilizations, 
the role of Islam as the dominant faith, cultural Russification, and the 
emergence of strong-weak states (McMann, 2004; Jones Luong, 2004), 
skewed development built around the exploitation and export of natural 
resources (Pomfret, 2006), environmental degradation, and international 
isolation (Cummings, 2012). The challenges were also many-fold, but 
they affected the five republics somewhat unevenly. First, unlike other 
post-Soviet states (for example Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and the 
Baltic states) where a prior history of independent statehood existed, the 
post-Soviet era marks the first experience of independent statehood. 
Local contemporary (post-Soviet) historiography tends to bracket the 
Soviet period as a parenthesis (and a negative one) in the otherwise 
centuries-long, seemingly natural (whereas in fact reconstructed as 
teleological) process of building statehood and common national identity. 
Some countries managed to stage a relatively stable and orderly 
transition to independence (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan), 
whereas others quickly descended into a civil war (Tajikistan, 1992-
1997). Kyrgyzstan alternated phases of bloody inter-communal conflict 
(1990, 2010) with sudden regime changes (2005 and 2010), unexpected 
openings, and hopeful moments of pluralism (early 1990s, post-2010 
period). Either way, recent scholarship, drawing on both local and 
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Russian archival sources, has demonstrated how the link between the 
pre-Russian polities (before the southward and eastward expansion of the 
Tsarist Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) like the 
Kazakh tribal confederation in the northern part of the Central Asian 
region and the Khanates of Khiva and Kokand as well as the Emirate of 
Bukhara (stretching across large parts of the southern part of the region) 
and the modern states is tenuous at best, and actually rather questionable 
(Schoeberlein, 1994; Hirsch, 2005; Adams, 2010). Although the Samanid 
dynasty (eighth to tenth centuries) in the Tajik case and the Timurid and 
Shaybanid dynasties (fourteenth-sixteenth centuries and fifteenth-
sixteenth centuries respectively) came to be referred to as the 
predecessors of today’s Tajik and Uzbek states, for example, evidence in 
support of such claims appears feeble. The formal of national 
consciousness in the modern sense of the term began with and 
accelerated under Soviet rule (Hirsch, 2000).
Despite some noticeable variety in terms of sub-types, the Central 
Asian republics converged towards authoritarian rule.3 While the United 
3¡ Tajikistan rapidly descended into a civil war (1992-1997) whereas Kyrgyzstan experimented with 
democracy on various occasions (early 1990s, 2010-present). Tajikistan’s rather turbulent post-
Soviet life was marked by sudden uprisings (2005, 2010) which overthrew the regime, descent 
into chaos (inter-communal conflict in June 2010). 
Table 1. Size and Population
Korea Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan Tajikistan Uzbekistan
Sq. km 99,720 2,724,900 199,951 488,100 143,100 447,400
Population 
(1,000)
48,860 17,522 5,495 5,054 7,768 28,394
Ethnic 
groups
Korean 99%
Kazakh 63.1% 
Russian 23.7%
Uzbek 2.8%
Korean 0.6% 
(100,385)
Kyrgyz 64.7%
Uzbek 13.6%
Russian 12.5%
Korean 0.3%
(19,000)
Turkmen 85%
Uzbek 5 %
Korean 0.05%
(3,000)
Tajik 79.9%
Uzbek 15.3%
Russian 1.1%
Korean 0.07% 
(6,000)
Uzbek 80%
Russian 5.5%
Tajik 5%
Koreans 0.69% 
(198,000)
Source: CIA Factbook 2012 (South Korea, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.)4
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States and the European Union occasionally pressed for political reforms, 
criticizing the local rulers for violations of human rights and harassment 
of opposition and civil society, there was no shortage of partners willing 
to be silent on those issues, including China, Russia, Malaysia, and 
indeed, South Korea, too (Cooley, 2012; Graubner, 2012).4
Second, all the new states – to different extents (Table 1) – were 
home to ethnically plural societies (Smith et al., 1998). In search for 
legitimacy not gained by means of an anti-colonial/anti-Soviet struggle 
the Central Asia rulers embarked on a process of distancing themselves 
from the Soviet past, emphasizing instead a rather primordialist, if not 
outright essentialist, approach to national identity formation. Three 
distinct but intertwined issues characterized the process of post-Soviet 
nation-building in Central Asia.5 These were, first, the state-led emphasis 
on the development of national cultures and the (elevation of the) role 
that titular (majority) national groups would and should play in the new 
states, second, the resulting position of minority groups, and third, given 
the nature of the Central Asian borders crisscrossing communities, the 
relationship between kin states and the co-ethnics left on the “other” side 
of the border by the Soviet collapse and the elevation of previously 
administrative borders to state boundaries (Fumagalli, 2007a). The 
question of identity transformation was especially relevant to the local 
ethnic Korean population. Settled in the Russian Far East and deported to 
Central Asia in 1937, Soviet Koreans (or Koryo saram, as they are more 
commonly known now6) total approximately 700,000 across the entire 
former Soviet Union, of whom about 500,000 are settled in Central Asia 
(Kim, G., 1995 and 2000; Khan, 1998; Kim & King, 2002). As briefly 
examined below, the sudden (re)discovery of a local Korean diaspora – 
4¡ Another approximately 125,000 Koreans live in the territory of the Russian Federation.
5¡ Or in the entire post-Soviet space, for that matter.
6¡ These ethnic Koreans are also known as Koryoin.
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perhaps not forgotten, but certainly inaccessible in Soviet times – was 
among the drivers of a South Korean interest in the region in the early 
1990s.
Third, moving away from a Soviet-style command economy raised 
the obvious question of the role that the state would play in the economy 
(Pomfret, 2006). East and Southeast Asian states, where the source of 
rapid economic growth is also attributed to state-led development, were 
often referred to as models. Endowments in natural resources varied 
considerably, with hydrocarbons concentrated primarily in Kazakhstan 
(oil and gas), Uzbekistan (gas), and Turkmenistan (gas). 
The smaller mountainous republics of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
were home to minerals and, crucially, water, which they have sought to 
turn into electricity and thus ensure energy self-sufficiency. Instead, 
because of the way in which the Soviet economy was structured, the 
region’s national economies were all tied to each other. Following 
industrial collapse and a “re-ruralization” of the population, the 
conditions of the population have either failed to improve or have done 
so extremely unevenly. The high prices of global commodities (oil, but 
also cotton and gold of which the region has plenty) have fueled an 
energy boom in the region starting from the early 2000s. That said, the 
Central Asian economies have been, as a result, largely skewed in favor 
of natural resource development, exploitation, and export. Being 
landlocked, the region needs to access markets as well as transport routes 
to export its resources. Infrastructure used to be inward-looking in the 
Table 2. Natural Resource Endowments in Central Asia
Oil Natural Gas
Production Reserves Production Reserves
Kazakhstan 1.635m BBL/day 30bn BBL 20.2bcm 2.407tcm
Turkmenistan 220,200 BBL/day 600m BBL 45.3bn 7.504tcm
Uzbekistan 104,400 BBL/day 594m BBL 60.11bcm 1.841tcm
Source: CIA Factbook 2012 (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan).
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Soviet period, with the pipeline networks oriented north-westwards, 
towards Russia and the western part of the Soviet state. Connecting the 
region to the rest of the world via other access routes has sparked interest 
by state and non-state actors alike, fueling references to a renewed 
“Great Game” over Central Asian natural resources (Nguyen, 2006; 
Cooley, 2012).
Last, but not least, was the development of independent foreign 
policies. Here the most evident commonality and legacy was the 
international isolation that the Central Asian republics inherited at 
independence (Cummings, 2012). This was inevitable since all relations 
with the rest of the world (communist, Muslim, and other) had been 
mediated from Moscow. As a result, the new states were plagued with a 
lack of expertise, experience, and even personnel (very few Central 
Asians occupied senior positions in the Soviet Foreign Ministry). The 
five states showed considerable heterogeneity in their patterns of 
behavior/conduct and orientations. Tajikistan soon emerged as Moscow’s 
closest ally in the region, to the point that some referred to it as a client 
state or even a new colony. Turkmenistan, by contrast, opted for a policy 
of neutrality, avoiding membership in organizations and alliances and 
tying itself to any partner. Kazakhstan adopted a multi-vector policy, 
seeking to maintain good relations with all partners (the United States, 
China, and Russia). Similarly, Kyrgyzstan managed to develop good ties 
with many countries, though for reasons opposite to Kazakhstan’s. 
Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, could rely on its vast natural resource 
endowments to entice foreign interest, whereas deeply-impoverished and 
resource-poor Kyrgyzstan needed aid and other sources of foreign 
income (also in the form of rents) to maintain political support and 
domestic patronage networks to maintain some form of stability. 
Uzbekistan strove to preserve sovereignty and autonomy in the 
international arena, and alternated phases of close relations with Moscow 
with warm relations with Washington (Fumagalli, 2007b). Despite 
evident state weakness (again, in varying degrees), the region’s 
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interaction with the outside world was shaped as much by great powers 
and external players in general as by local rulers (Cooley, 2012; 
Fumagalli, 2007b and 2010).
Next to be explained are the paper examines the drivers of South 
Korea’s push into Central Asia. To be clear, this did not happen in a 
vacuum. Although relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union – 
especially at an official level – are a recent development, one issue 
brought together Koreans (but not South Korea) and the Soviet 
experience, namely the fate of the Koryo saram. Although a primarily 
domestic (Soviet) issue, the question of the adaptation of ethnic Koreans 
to Soviet and later post-Soviet life, their political loyalty, and cultural 
adaptation, as well as the discovery of ethnic bonds with Koreans from 
South Korea prompted interest in this diasporic community of over half a 
million people (Kwon, 1996; Lee, 2003; Oh, 1996; Diener, 2006; Oka, 
2001). 
Korean-Central Asian Relations in the Post-Soviet 
Period
The collapse of the Soviet state opened an unexpected window of 
opportunity for the Central Asian republics. These could develop new 
contacts with the outside world. In turn, the South Korean state could 
enter into new political, cultural, and economic relations with a 
previously isolated region. Diplomatic relations between South Korea 
and the newly independent republics in the region were established in 
1992. New opportunities for traveling and the process of cultural 
adaptation raised the possibility that local Koreans might opt for out-
migration, with South Korea as a possible destination.7 In the wake of the 
7¡ Needless to say, this should not be conceived as a “return,” since the Koryo saram did not come 
from the southern part of the peninsula. Rather, their ancestors were Koreans settled in the 
Maritime Province of the Tsarist Empire. 
80
Soviet collapse many speculated that these communities could operate as 
bridges between the post-Soviet space and East Asia. This failed to 
materialize, however, for three main reasons: first and foremost, “Soviet 
Koreans” had never actually lived in South Korea (established in 1948) 
or even in the Korean peninsula as a whole as they were descendants of 
Koreans who had settled in the areas of Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, and 
Manchuria. Moreover, Koreans became model Soviet citizens, also 
showing high levels of linguistic and cultural Russification. Finally, 
South Korea’s interest in its post-Soviet diaspora is a very recent 
development. While some people left for South Korea, many others 
remained, a sign of a deeply-rooted territorialization of identity among 
the Koryo saram (Diener, 2006).
The Making of Soviet Koreans: Russian, Central Asian, and Korean 
Relations before and during the Soviet Period
A Korean presence in Russia and Central Asia dates to the middle of the 
nineteenth century (roughly from 1863 onwards), when the Russian 
acquisition of the territories of Preamur and Primor’e established a 
Korean presence in the Russian Empire’s Far East (Chey, 1987; 
Huttenbach, 1993; Lee, 2003; Suh, 1987). Koreans were then fleeing the 
exploitation by the Korean monarchy and the abuse by landowners and 
money-lenders (Diener, 2006, p. 204). At the turn of the century Russia’s 
fear of Japan raised the question of the allegiance of the Korean 
population, and the government began relocating those Koreans who had 
settled in the Far East after 1884 outside the border regions, only 
allowing those that were living there by that date to remain. The empire 
preferred to have allegedly more loyal ethnic Russians at its utmost 
periphery. In a similar “preventative” move, in 1937 Stalin gave orders to 
deport the Korean population from the border regions of the Soviet Far 
East to the deserts and steppes of Central Asia (Gelb, 1995). Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan were the recipients of the deported Koreans, with a 
81 
smaller number reaching Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Koreans, settled in 
rural areas, devoted themselves to rice farming.
During the Soviet period, and particularly in the post-Stalin era, 
Koreans moved from the countryside – where they were originally 
relocated from the Far East – to urban centers. In fact, the Koryo saram 
increasingly became a predominantly urban population. They also turned 
out to be one of the most culturally Russified communities8 and 
integrated in Soviet society. Following Stalin’s death in 1953 the Soviet 
regime redressed some of the earlier policies and therefore Koreans were 
allowed to re-establish their ethnic identity, culture and language’ (Kim, 
G., 1999 and 2000).
In the Soviet period, however, the existence of an ethnic Korean 
community in Soviet territory and the official ties to North Korea were 
the pillars of the Soviet-Korean relationship. The situation changed 
virtually overnight as the Soviet state unraveled and fifteen new 
republics suddenly came to independence. Seoul’s involvement in 
Central Asia began no sooner than 1991-1992 (Fumagalli, 2006). Ties 
with Pyongyang were swiftly replaced with an upgrading of relations 
with Seoul.9 The next section traces the main rationales and aims of 
Korean policy towards the region.
Seoul’s Quest for Energy Assets
As noted above, the Central Asian republics inherited diplomatic ties 
with North Korea. Despite some initial efforts, Pyongyang’s role was 
limited to the occasional visits by ethnic Koreans to the DPRK. North 
Korean influence was quickly dislodged by South Korea’s greater 
8¡ This integration by Koreans into Russian society happened to the detriment of national language, 
culture, and traditions (Yoon, 2000).
9¡ The only Central Asian republic hosting a DPRK Embassy at present is Uzbekistan. All others 
republic have ties with Pyongyang, however.
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attractiveness as an economic model and its potential as an investor. 
Domestic policy and foreign policy have traditionally been closely 
intertwined in South Korea, with the former looming large in domestic 
politics (Kim, S., 2006; Kim, Y., 2008a; Kim, Y., 2008b; Kim, Y., 2011). 
The paramount concerns have, for decades, been hard security issues, 
namely its relationship with North Korea, its ties with the United States 
and Washington’s role in the broader East Asian region and on the 
Korean Peninsula specifically (Kim, 2006; Cha, 2012). Next, in order of 
importance have been the relationships with China and Japan (Snyder, 
2009). Anything else, especially “non-traditional security issues” (such 
as energy security and Seoul’s energy security dilemma), has only 
reached the top of policy agenda over the past ten to fifteen years. The 
deepening of ties with Central Asia represents a marked change in 
Seoul’s foreign policy and positioning in the global arena.
Even at a superficial glance, the Central Asian and Korean 
economies appear complementary. The former as exporter and the latter 
as consumer and importer constitute the “glue” of the partnership. 
Seoul’s push to cooperate with and invest in Central Asia owes to three 
distinct but related strategic predicaments in which South Korea finds 
itself (Calder & Kim, 2008, p. 1): “the lack of local sources of energy 
(South Korea imports about 84 percent of its energy); heavy reliance on 
oil (50 percent); and heavy dependence on the Middle East as the main 
supplier of hydrocarbons (75 percent)” (ibid.).
In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, South Korea positioned 
itself as one of Uzbekistan’s key investors and commercial partners. 
Apart from seeking to open the country up (and the region more broadly) 
in terms of transport, the other chief aim consisted of investing in 
strategic fields such as uranium, textiles, and the automobile sector. 
Initial acceleration slowed down considerably because of exogenous 
shocks. The financial crisis which gripped Asia (including South Korea) 
in 1997 was not inconsequential in terms of affecting Asian investment in 
Central Asia. Projects were suspended10 and investment decreased for a 
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few years (Rabelland, 2000).
Despite being a late-comer in the energy field and the delay 
because of the Asian crisis,
10
the new century was marked by a more 
assertive economic drive. Initially focused on Uzbekistan, over time 
South Korea has expanded its range of interests to Kazakhstan. Despite 
losing shares in the Uz-Daewoo car plant in the Ferghana Valley and the 
Babool Textiles factory, South Korea has remained Uzbekistan’s main 
investor, with over $1 billion worth of investment in areas as different as 
gold, tungsten, coal, electronics, the local banking market and, most 
importantly, the energy domain (Peyrouse, 2010). In 2006 Uzbekneftegaz 
and Korea National Oil Corporation and Korea Gas Corporation signed a 
Memorandum giving the two Korean companies exclusive rights of 
exploration and exploitation of two oil and gas deposits in Chust-Pap and 
Namangan-Terachi (ibid.) A few years later South Korea’s KOGAS and 
Uzbekneftegaz signed an agreement for the joint exploration of the 
Surgil gas site on the Ustyurt Plateau in Uzbekistan (ibid.). Alongside 
interest in Uzbekistan’s hydrocarbons, Seoul has also sought to reduce its 
dependence on uranium imports. In this respect Korea Resources 
Corporation is developing the deposit of Zhantuar. In 2008 Korea 
Electric Power (KEPCO) signed an agreement for the purchase of 2,600 
tons of uranium (approximately 9 percent of South Korea’s total 
consumption) by 2015. Logistics and transport have also featured 
prominently in Uzbek-South Korean relations. The flagship project has 
been that of Navoi, in central Uzbekistan, where Tashkent has established 
a Free Industrial Economic Zone (FIEZ). Hanjin Group, the large South 
Korean conglomerate specialized in cargo freight (and parent company 
of Korean Air), has established its base there, determined to make the 
town an important transport hub in Asia. The location of this project is 
10¡ Daewoo suspended its projects in the automobile sector in Andijan, Uzbekistan, and in the 
Kazakh telecom sector in 1998 (Rabelland, 2000). 
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especially important since the Navoi Free Economic Zone sits on large 
amounts of gold and uranium.
The country has been similarly active in Kazakhstan. A 
Memorandum of Understanding was signed between Seoul and Astana to 
allow for the exploration of oil fields in the Caspian Sea by the Korean 
Consortium of the Caspian Oil Project. The Korea National Oil 
Corporation, including SK, LG International, Daesung Industrial, and 
Samsung, acquired 27% of the shares of the Zhambyl offshore oil field 
for about $85 million. Exploration would be conducted jointly with 
KazMunayGaz, Kazakhstan’s state-owned energy giant (ibid.). In the 
2008s Korea and Kazakhstan reached an agreement over the import of 
3,000 tons of uranium during the period 2011-2017 (ibid.).
In sum, by the time President Lee Myung-bak took office in 2009, 
Seoul had gradually managed to establish a significant and growing 
commercial presence in the region, built around specific needs of the 
regional economies, and tailored to specific countries. Uzbekistan was 
the priority for South Korean investment until very recently. The new 
administration sought to capitalize on earlier efforts, as well as deepen 
and expand cooperation. 
South Korea’s Global Posture and Lee Myung-bak’s “New Asia 
Initiative”
Since taking office in 2009 President Lee Myung-bak has adopted a more 
decisive and assertive stance towards the Central Asian region. South 
Korea’s strategy has been carefully tailored, involving a combination of 
high level diplomacy, including visits by and summits at presidential 
level (South Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum); strategies tailored 
to the needs and characteristics of the individual states; and close 
cooperation between South Korean companies. This is not an isolated 
move, but rather should be read as part of a broader attempt by the Lee 
administration to redefine South Korea’s role in global and regional 
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politics in a more encompassing and ambitious manner (Shim & Flamm, 
2012, p. 10). As noted above, Korea’s foreign policy has been 
traditionally anchored to the East Asian region, northeast Asia most 
notably. Its ties to the United States, the DPRK question, and relations 
with China and Japan have dominated Seoul’s foreign policy. Northeast 
Asia is also of paramount importance for the Lee administration, too. In 
this respect, there is an obvious continuity running through all 
administrations, including Lee’s immediate predecessors President Roh 
Moo-hyun (2003-2008) and President Kim Dae-jung (1997-2002).11 
Where the Lee presidency differs from them, however, is two-fold. First, 
new initiatives are embedded in an ambitious strategy to redefine Seoul’s 
international role regionally and even globally (“Global Korea” CWD, 
2009). Seoul no longer seems content with a policy largely defined by its 
Northeast Asian location, where much bigger players overshadow it. 
“Broadening Global Partnerships,” as the document notes, is a means to 
that end (ibid., p. 24). Second, through its New Asia Initiative (Zhu, 
2009) Seoul has sought to deepen ties especially with other Asian 
neighbors to the south and the west. Relations with ASEAN countries 
have expanded, and the engagement of the Central Asian republics 
should also be seen in this light. In other terms Seoul has attempted to 
reposition itself as a “bridge between developed and developing 
countries” (Shim & Flamm, 2012, p. 10), so as to expand its international 
role and raise its leverage (Zhu, 2007 and 2009).
In the New Asia Initiative, launched in Indonesia in March 2009, 
Central Asia occupies an important place (Zhu, 2009; Korea Herald, 2009 
and 2010). At a general level the Initiative aims to broaden the horizon of 
South Korea’s diplomacy, long-focused on the Pacific and specifically on 
its relationships with the United States, North Korea, China, and Japan. 
11¡ As even a quick glance at official policy documents would confirm (NSC, 2004; MND, 2006; 
Cheongwadae, 2009; MND, 2010).
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Partnership with the ASEAN countries figures more prominently, as well 
cooperation with Australia, New Zealand, and the Central Asian 
countries. In a break with the past, the initiative lays out a vision for a 
more assertive South Korean leadership in the political, security, and 
economic sphere. Here non-traditional security challenges are likely to 
be of crucial importance for the foreseeable future, including the question 
of energy security. The strategy refrains from bundling all countries in an 
undistinguished regional mass, but rather tailors the approach to specific 
regions and countries. Building on its experience in the post-
independence period South Korea has focused on a few key countries 
(especially Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan more recently) and a number of 
strategic sectors (most notably gas, uranium, and petrochemicals, and 
more recently infrastructure). What follows details the scope and breadth 
of South Korea’s presence in the region.
Direct investment and the quest for assets have characterized 
Seoul’s engagement of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.12 In recent years 
deals have increased in number and size. South Korea is currently 
Uzbekistan’s fourth-largest commercial partner: over the past two 
decades trade turnover between the two countries has surpassed $5 
billion, of which $3 billion is represented by South Korean investment, 
with about 400 South Korean firms operating in the country (Central 
Asia Newswire, 2012a; Voloshin, 2012). Cooperation ranges from loans 
to support for Tashkent’s media and medical sectors (Central Asia 
Newswire, 2012b), and focuses on strategic partnerships in a number of 
key sectors, with a special focus on hydrocarbons13, minerals, and 
12¡ These two countries have also been recipient of South Korea’s overseas aid program through 
KOICA (Korea International Cooperation Agency) and have been singled out as being among 
the twenty-eight top priority countries. 
13¡ Here the focus is on the acquisition of assets, as shown by the agreements to jointly explore and 
exploit oil and gas fields in the country signed in 2006 (Chust-Pap and Namangan-Terachi) and 
2012 (Surgil). 
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uranium, key to South Korea’s nuclear power plants.14 Korea is also 
Kazakhstan’s fourteen-largest trading partner, with trade turnover 
exceeding $ 600 million in the first half of 2012, and $1 billion overall in 
2011, a noticeable increase from $760 million in 2010 (Voloshin, 2012). 
On the whole South Korea has invested $3 billion in several projects, 
with plans to invest much more in a thermal power plant in southeastern 
Kazakhstan, the exploration of the Zhambyl oil field (in cooperation with 
KazMunayGaz), and the production of rare earths elements (ibid.). 
Central Asia Calling
Although the intensification of South Korean-Central Asian relations 
have been by and large driven by Seoul’s attention and interest in the 
region’s natural resources and local economies, one should not downplay 
the importance of local agency and interests in pushing for closer ties 
(Fumagalli, 2006 and 2011). Economic cooperation between South 
Korea and its Asian partners was not driven by Seoul’s own priorities 
only: a quest for closer ties was also locally-driven. Local governments 
made constant and very public references to Asian countries (such as 
Singapore, Malaysia, and South Korea) as models of economic 
development. Their reluctance to meddle in the countries’ domestic 
affairs (and entrenched authoritarian practices) was much appreciated 
locally. At a more substantive level the particular and peculiar structure 
of the South Korean (and Japanese, incidentally) economy, where large 
industrial conglomerates offer a number of needed services (a one-stop 
approach) was especially appealing to landlocked economies (Calder & 
Kim, 2008). Unlike China, mostly interested in importing raw materials 
and exporting finished goods, South Korea can rely on its specific 
14¡ These include the construction of silicon plants by the Uz-Shindong joint venture in Navoi 
(launched in August 2012) and Jizzakh (to be developed in the future) (Central Asia Newswire 
2012b).
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industrial structure whereby its large industrial conglomerates (the 
chaebols) provide a whole range of services (including exporting capital 
equipment, finding markets, and supplying and financing infrastructure) 
that can lift the local economies from their isolation (Calder & Kim, 
2008, p. 8). By contrast, the chaebols could ensure trading flows, 
handling multiple (most, in fact) sides of transactions, including 
exporting capital equipment, financing transaction themselves, supplying 
and financing infrastructure, and even finding export markets (ibid.). All 
this for isolated and non-market economies was especially attractive.15
Conclusion
The paper has examined South Korea’s engagement in Central Asia as a 
case study of the country’s broader efforts to establish itself as a more 
assertive regional and global economic and political player. For decades, 
Seoul’s foreign policy was decisively tilted towards the Pacific. 
Rebalancing its Asian policy towards smaller and less geographically 
proximate neighbors was made more complicated by the fact that at the 
very same time Central Asia was attracting the interest – and the 
resources – of major global players, such as the United States, Russia, 
China, and more recently the European Union.
It is evident that South Korea cannot compete with any of the big 
players (Russia, China, the United States) in Central Asia.16 Seoul does 
not possess the financial resources to sustain larger-scale investment and 
projects. Moreover, the size of South Korea’s local economic demand is 
15¡ The role of the chaebols in South Korean society and the economy has been the subject of 
increasingly critical scrutiny, and it is not my intention to portray them in an idyllic manner. 
However, a thorough investigation of their role goes well beyond the scope of this paper. On this 
see Kim (1998); Haggard, Lim, and Kim (2010); Lee (2008); and Chang (2006).
16¡ Due to space constraints it is not possible to assess South Korea’s strategy towards the region in 
relation to the policy of other major players. For a discussion along those lines see Laruelle & 
Peyrouse (2012).
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insufficient to sustain such a strategy (Calder & Kim, 2008). Instead, 
South Korea has sought to develop a different strategy to turn some 
structural weaknesses into added value. It does not appear to have 
political ambitions in the region, and therefore carries no political 
baggage in its economic relationships, despite the fact that in recent years 
it has also sought to enhance its political visibility and relations.
The growth of South Korea’s role in Central Asia is not an isolated 
case of East-Central Asian cooperation (Oxford Analytica, 2011b). So 
far, South Korean, Chinese, and Japanese strategies in Central Asia and 
Mongolia have managed to develop along cooperative lines, contributing 
to increasingly integrative dynamics between the two regions. India’s 
role is noticeable in Afghanistan, and only to a lesser extent in Tajikistan 
and Kazakhstan, but less so in the other Central Asian republics. 
Needless to say, it is not New Delhi’s role in the region that has prompted 
vigor in Seoul’s attitude towards the region. It is obviously China’s 
multi-dimensional strategy towards Central Asia that is impacting on 
South Korea’s too. However, it is important to note that unlike China (or 
Russia, for that matter), South Korea does not come with either colonial 
or neo-colonial “baggage” (Fumagalli, 2011). South Korean-Central 
Asian relations are not characterized by the concern, even the mistrust 
that often marks the ties between China and its Central Asian neighbors, 
which occasionally bursts into Sinophobia, despite the pretense of 
closeness and partnership by the Central Asian elites (Oxford Analytica, 
2011a).
Economically South Korean-Central Asian relations operate at a 
different level compared to those between Central Asia and China. While 
both South Korea and China are driven by a quest for Central Asia’s 
natural resources, South Korea has something different (not more) to 
offer: not the size of the deals and the investments, but the diversity of 
the areas in which South Korean investment occurs as well as the 
comprehensiveness of the services that South Korean companies can 
provide connecting Central Asia to other markets.
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While a gradual and tailored strategy has allowed Seoul to carve 
itself an important economic niche in the region, three challenges stand 
clear in the way of further expansion in the near future. First and 
foremost, one of the aspects of South Korea’s presence in Central Asia 
that the local authoritarian rulers have undoubtedly appreciated has been 
Seoul’s silence on issues such as the lack of democracy, the rule of law, 
the frequent violations of human rights, the crackdowns on the 
opposition, and the opacity of the Central Asian states and economies 
(Graubner, 2012). On the whole South Korea does not appear to have 
political ambitions in the region. Seoul does not meddle in the republics’ 
domestic affairs, something which is very much appreciated regionally. 
In fact the country does not really appear to have any political clout in 
the local republics. The problem is that South Korea’s uncritical 
engagement of Central Asian authoritarianism not only makes it 
vulnerable to the volatile political environment in the region, but also 
tarnishes the image of a would-be global player. Next, although Central 
Asia currently lends itself as a friendly environment to South Korean 
investment, should this expand further, Russia may at some point set 
limits to how far its prior hegemony can be challenged in its immediate 
neighborhood, especially when tangible economic interests are touched. 
Finally, greater integration between Central and East Asia, and South 
Korea in particular, inevitably raises the question of the unreliability of 
North Korea as a potential economic partner. Building pipelines through 
or even just contemplating ways of integrating Pyongyang in larger intra-
Asian economic consortia may be too big a gamble for the time being.
To conclude, the driver behind Seoul’s push into the region has 
been primarily economic. With investment and deals in sectors as diverse 
as hydrocarbons and uranium, infrastructure and culture, textile and 
information technology, South Korea has quietly established itself as a 
significant economic player in Central Asia. South Korea’s expansion in 
Central Asia is both noteworthy in itself (since Seoul was a latecomer to 
the region) and also because it is an important component of Seoul’s 
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broader attempt to establish the country as a global economic player. In 
this respect Seoul’s engagement of neighbors proximate and not in 
Central Asia well complements – though does not balance of course – 
South Korea’s longstanding priorities in East Asia: ties to the United 
States, relationship with China and Japan, and North Korea. Driven 
primarily by domestic economic concerns, South Korea’s global profile 
is changing.
92
REFERENCES
Adams, Laura L. (2010). The Spectacular State: Culture and Identity in 
Uzbekistan. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Beissinger, Mark. (2002). Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet 
State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Berkshire, Jonathan. (2012). Korea Woos Tajikistan. Central Asia and the 
Caucasus Analyst, August 22. 
Calder, Kent, E. & Kim, Viktoriya. (2008). Korea, the United States, and Central 
Asia: Far-flung partners in a Globalising World. Washington, Korea 
Economic Institute, Academic Paper Series, 3(9), 
Cha, Victor. (2012). The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future. London: 
Bodley Head.
Chang Sea-Jin. (2006). Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business 
Groups: The Rise and Fall of Chaebols. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press.
Cheongwadae. (Blue House, CWD). (2009). Global Korea: The National Security 
Strategy of the Republic of Korea. Seoul, Office of the President. 
Chey, Y.C. (1987). Soviet Koreans and their culture in the USSR. In D.S. Suh 
(Ed.), Koreas in the Soviet Union. Honolulu: Center for Korean Studies, 
60-84. 
Central Asia Newswire. (2012a). Korea to loan Uzbekistan $595M for medical 
upgrades, media outlets, 6 September. 
Central Asia Newswire. (2012b). Uzbek-Korean Joint Venture to build second 
silicon plant, 10 September. 
Central Asia Newswire. (2012c). Korea sets sights on more trade with Tajikistan, 
September 4. 
CIA World Factbook. (2012). Kazakhstan. https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html 
CIA World Factbook. (2012). Kyrgyzstan. https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kg.html 
CIA World Factbook. (2012). South Korea. https://www.cia.gov/library/
93 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html
CIA World Factbook. (2012). Turkmenistan. https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tx.html 
CIA World Factbook. (2012). Tajikistan. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/ti.html 
CIA World Factbook. (2012). Uzbekistan.https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html
Cooley, Alexander. (2012). Great Games, Local Rule: The New Great Power 
Contest in Central Asia. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Cummings, Sally N. (2012). Understanding Central Asia: Politics and Contested 
Transformations. London: Routledge. 
Diener, Alexander. (2006). Homeland as social construct: Territorialization among 
Kazakhstan’s Germans and Koreans. Nationalities Papers, 34(2), 201-235.
Fumagalli, Matteo. (2006). Identity and Interests in South Korea’s Policy 
towards Central Asia. Seoul, Academy of Korean Studies, Proceedings of 
the World Congress of Korean Studies, III, 183-191.
Fumagalli, Matteo. (2007a). Ethnicity, State Formation, and Foreign Policy: 
Uzbekistan and Uzbeks abroad. Central Asian Survey, 26(1), 105-122.
Fumagalli, Matteo. (2007b). Alignments and Re-alignments in Central Asia: The 
Rationale and Implications of Uzbekistan’s Relations with Russia. 
International Political Science Review, 28(3), 253-271.
Fumagalli, Matteo. (2007c). Tajikistan and the EU: From Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction to Critical Engagement. Brussels, CEPS Policy Brief, 132(1). 
Fumagalli, Matteo. (2010). The US and Central Asia. In Emilian Kavalski (Ed.), 
The New Central Asia. Singapore, World Scientific, 177-190.
Fumagalli, Matteo. (2011). Global Insider: South-Korea Central Asia Relations. 
World Politics Review, 7 September. Retrieved November 26, 2012, from 
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/9926/global-insider-south-
korea-central-asia-relations/
Gelb, M. (1995). An Early Soviet Ethnic Deportation: The Far-Eastern Koreans. 
Russian Review, 54(3), 389-412.
Graubner, Cornelius (2012). Uzbekistan: South Korea’s feeling lucky. Eurasianet, 
94
June 5. 
Haggard, Stephan, Lim, Wonhyuk & Kim, Euysung. (Eds.) (2010). Economic 
Crisis and Corporate Restructuring in Korea: Reforming the Chaebol. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hirsch, Francine. (2005). Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the 
Making of the Soviet Union. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Huttenbach, Henry. (1993). The Soviet Koreans: Product of Russo-Korean 
Imperial Rivalry. Central Asian Survey, 12(1), 59-69.
Jones Luong, Pauline. (Ed.). (2004). The Transformation of Central Asia: States 
and Societies from Soviet Rule to Independence. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
Khan, Valery V. (1995). Istoriia koreitsev Kazakhstana. Almaty, Ghylym. 
Khan, Valeriy, V. (1998). The Korean Minority in Central Asia: National Revival 
and Problem of Identity. International Journal of Central Asian Studies, 3.
Kim, Eun Mee. (1998). From Dominance to Symbiosis: State and Chaebol in 
Korea. Pacific Focus, 3(2), 105-121.
Kim, German, N. (1995). Koreans abroad: Past, Present, and Future. Almaty. 
Kim, German, N. (1999). Istoria immigratsii Koreitsev. Kinga Pervaia, Vtoroia 
polovina 19 v -1945 g. Almaty: Daik Press. 
Kim, German, N. (2000). Kore Saram: Istoriografiya i Bibliografiya. Almaty: 
Kazakh Universiteti. 
Kim Youngmi. (2008a). Intra-party politics and minority coalition government in 
South Korea. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 9(3): 367-398.
Kim Youngmi. (2008b). Explaining the minority coalition government and 
governability in South Korea. Korea Observer, 39 (1), 59-94.
Kim Youngmi. (2011). The Politics of Coalition in Korea: Between Institutions and 
Culture. London: Routledge. 
Kim, German N. & King, R. (2001). The Koryo Saram: Koreans in the Former 
USSR. Korean and Korean American Studies Bulletin, 12(2-3), 19-45.
Kim, Samuel S. (2006). The Two Koreas and the Great Powers. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
95 
Korea Herald. (2009). With New Asia Initiative, Korea comes of age, March 18.
Korea Herald. (2010). Summit and S. Korea’s ‘New Asia Initiative,’ March 30.
Korea Times. (2005). Korea, Uzbekistan to Broaden Economic Ties, May 11. 
Korea Times. (2006). Korea, Uzbekistan Agree on $20 Million Gas Deal, August 
30. 
Korea Times. (2012). Korea, Kazakhstan Agree to Expand Cooperation in Energy, 
September 13. 
Kwon, H.Y. (1996). The Koreans in the World: The Commonwealth of Independent 
States. Seoul: Korean Ministry of National Unification. 
Laruelle, Marlene & Peyrouse, Sebastien. (2012). Globalising Central Asia: 
Geopolitics and the Challenges of Development. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Lee, C.M. (2003). The Lost Sheep: The Soviet Deportation of Ethnic Koreans and 
Volga Germans. Review of Korean Studies, 6(1), 219-250.
Lee, J.Y. (2003). Korea’s policy for Ethnic Koreans Overseas. Korea Focus, July-
August.
Lee, J.H. (2006). Korea, Uzbekistan Agree on Joint Oil, Gas Development. 
Ferghana.ru, March 29.
Lee, Jaehyon. (2010). ROK’s ‘New Asia Initiative’ in 2010: Directions and Tasks. 
IFANS Focus, February 18. 
Lee Sookjong. (2008). The Politics of Chaebol Reform in Korea: Social Cleavage 
and New Financial Rules. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38(3), 439-452
McMann, Kelly. (2004). The Civic Realm in Kyrgyzstan: Soviet Economic 
Legacies and Activists Expectations. In Pauline Jones Luong (Ed.), The 
Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to 
Independence. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Nguyen, D. (2006). Korea enters the Great Game. Asia Times, May 13.
Oh, C.J. (2006). Diaspora Nationalism: The Case of Ethnic Korean Minority in 
Kazakhstan and Its Lessons for the Crimean Tatars in Turkey. Nationalities 
Papers, 34(2), 111-129.
Olcott, Martha B. (1992). Central Asia’s Catapult to Independence. Foreign 
Affairs, 71(3), 108-130.
96
Oka, N. (2001). The Korean Diaspora in Nationalizing Kazakhstan: Strategies for 
Survival as an Ethnic Minority. Korean and Korean American Studies 
Bulletin, 12(2/3), 89-113.
Oxford Analytica. (2011a). Central Asia: China’s rise splits elites, public. February 
14.
Oxford Analytica. (2011b). Seoul carves out a strategic niche in Central Asia. 
September 21.
Peyrouse, Sebastien. (2010). South Korea’s Advances in Central Asia. September 
1. 
Pomfret, Richard. (2006). The Central Asian Economies since Independence. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Rabelland, Gael. (2000). Asian investment in Central Asia: Is it coming back? 
Central Asia and the Caucasus Analyst, April 26.
RFE/RL. (2006). South Korea, Uzbekistan Sign Uranium Deal, September 25.
Ryu, J.C. (2005). Korea’s Policy Measures for Energy Security. Korea Focus, 
September-October. 
Schoeberlein-Engel, John S. (1994). Identity in Central Asia: Construction and 
contention in the conceptions of “Ozbek,” “Tajik,” “Muslim,” 
“Samarqandi” and other groups. (Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 
1994).
Shim, David & Flamm, Patrick. (2012). Rising South Korea: A Minor Player or a 
Regional Power? Hamburg, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area 
Studies, Working Paper No. 200. 
Smith G. et al. (1998). Nation building in the Post Soviet Borderlands: The Politics 
of National Identities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Snyder, Scott. (2009). China’s Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, 
Security. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Suh, D.S. (1987). Koreans in the Soviet Union. Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press.
Uzreport.com. (2006). South Korea, Uzbekistan Sign MoU on Uranium Supply, 
September 26.
Uzbekistan Today News Agency. (2010). Uzbekistan, South Korea Set for New 
97 
Stage of Cooperation, February 12. 
Yonhap News Agency. (2012). S. Korea, Kazakhstan Agree to Expand Cooperation 
in Energy, Plant, Atomic Power, September 13.
OECD. (2008). Development Cooperation of the Republic of Korea. 
Uzbekistan Newswire. (2011). Korea-Uzbek trade can hit $10b, Korean leader 
says, August 25.
Oh, Chong Jin. (2006). Diaspora Nationalism: The case of ethnic Korean minority 
in Kazakhstan and its lessons from the Crimean Tatars in Turkey. 
Nationalities Papers, 34(2), 111-29.
Yoon, I.J. (2000). Forced relocation, language use, and ethnic identity of Koreans 
in Central Asia. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 9, 35-64. 
Zhu, Zhiqun. (2007). Small Power, Big Ambition: South Korea’s Role in Northeast 
Asian Security under President Roh Moo-hyun. Asian Affairs, 34(2), 67-86.  
Zhu, Zhiqun. (2009). South Korea in a new Asia initiative. Asia Times, 30 June. 
Retrieved October 7, 2012, from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/
KF30Dg01.html/
Voloshin, Georgiy. (2012) South Korea and Kazakhstan Consolidate Bilateral 
Cooperation. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 13(19).
View publication stats
